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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of The Purge, Vent and Drain Subsystem FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Purge, Vent
and Drain (PV&D) hardware, generating draft failure modes and
potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with
proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter Purge, Vent and Drain hardware.
The Purge, Vent and Drain (PV&D) Subsystem controls the
environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities,
senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET Disconnect. The
subsystem is divided into six systems. The systems and hardware
components which were analyzed are described below:
o Purge System - Controls the environment of unpressurized
structural compartments
- Ducts
- Flexible Joints
- Check Valves
o In-line
o Bulkhead
- Umbilical Disconnects
o Vent System - Controls the pressure of unpressurized
compartments
- Vent Ports - Doors/Hinges
- Filters
o EMI Filters
o Contamination Filters
o Drain System - Removes water from unpressurized compartments
- Tubing/Couplings
- Quick Disconnects
o Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDSA) - Monitors hazardous
gas concentrations
- Tubing/Couplings
- Quick Disconnects
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2 •1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B.
5
SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Design and Function
The PV&D subsystem consists of six (6) basic systems, the primary
function of which is the environment control of the Orbiter
unpressurized structural cavities. The six systems are described
in the following paragraphs.
3.2 System Description
3.2.1 Purge System
The Orbiter Purge System services vehicle unpressurized
compartments, including the payload bay. The system is made up
of three circuits of on--board ducting that distributes purge gases
to and within the various compartments of the vehicle. Each
circuit has a separate interface at the starboard T--O
umbilical panel and functions during prelaunch and postlanding ....
operations for thermal, hazardous gas, moisture, and
contamination control. The three circuits are described below.
3.2.1.1 Circuit One -- services the Orbital Maneuvering System
(OMS) Pods, vertical stabilizer, wings, cabin annulus, forward
Reaction Control System (RCS) and Star Tracker. It is equipped
with check valves to prevent cross flow of gases during ascent
and descent.
3.2.1.2 Circuit Two -- services the lower midbody equipment bay
and the payload bay. Three special capped outlets are
incorporated in the system and are available for internal purging
or conditioning of payloads.
3.2.1.3 Circuit Three -- services the aft body engine
compartment. This circuit provides a dedicated flow to the three
main engine controllers and a bulk area dedicated conditioning
flow. Additional bulk area conditioning flow is provided by flow
from the "Circuit Two" system. This flow enters the aft body
through 14 check valves.
3.2.2 Vent System
The Orbiter Vent System provides ascent venting and descent
repressurization of unpressurized Orbiter compartments to
maintain differential pressures within Orbiter structural limits.
The vent ports provide outlets for ground purging and on--orbit
molecular venting of compartments containing thermal insulation°
The vent ports also minimize the effects of entry heating and
repressurization on the vehicle structure either by maintaining
the vent doors closed during the high heating phase of the flight
or by using heat sinks. To accomplish these tasks the Orbiter
uses the following three designs.
f
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o Electronically actuated vent doors (forward RCS, forward
fuselage plenum, mid fuselage, wings, aft fuselage/vertical
fin and OMS pods)
o Passive vents (open holes) with heat sinks for thermal
protection (rudders/speed break, elevons/elevon cavity)
o Self-vented compartments which freely vent (nose cap, wing
leading edge, body flap)
The active vent system consists of eighteen electromagnetically
actuated doors. The actuators are designed to meet fail--safe
requirements through the use of dual 3-phase AC motors,
independently powered, connected through a differential and slip
clutch to bell cranks, linkages and torque shafts. Vent door
positions are monitored by redundant limit switches which
indicate open, closed, and purge positions.
The sequence of the active vent system is controlled
automatically by the launch processing system for prelaunch
sequencing and the Orbiter general purpose computers during
ascent and descent phases. Manual sequencing capability
via CRT is required for de--orbit and post-landing operations.
3.2.3 Drain System
The Drain System consists of passive "through--hole" and active
"vacuum line" systems. The two systems are described below.
3.2.3.1 Passive System - consists of dedicated drain holes and
flow paths in selected structures which provide vertical or
vertical and horizontal gravity drainage.
3.2.3.2 Active System -- consists of three separate circuits
which service the forward fuselage plenum and forward RCS nose
wheel well compartments. The forward fuselage plenum drain line
is used in the horizontal mode, while the forward RCS and nose
wheel well drain lines are used primarily in the vertical mode.
The active drain system consists of 3/8-inch--diameter brazed
stainless steel lines that extend from the low point within the
compartment serviced to a disconnect located for easy
servicability during ground operations.
3.2.4 Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS)
The HGDS monitors hazardous gas concentrations (hydrogen, oxygen,
monomethylhydrazine, nitrogen tetroxide, and hydrazine) in
selected vehicle compartments (forward RCS fuselage, payload bay,
lower mid fuselage, aft fuselage, and OMS pods) during prelaunch,
landing and safing operations. GSE hypergolic measurement probes
are mounted external to the vehicle to monitor purge effluent
from the FWD RCS, OMS/RCS Pods, and aft fuselage vents. The
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cryogenic system consist of 1/5 inch diameter stainless steel
tubing vacuum lines connected to a GSE mass spectrometer. The
interface between the on--board tubing and GSE is thru the T--O
disconnect, therefore, the aft fuselage, payload bay, Lower Mid
Fuselage (LMF), and ET intertank area are monitored to lift--off.
3.2.5 Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS)
The WCCSprevents contamination (e.g. fog, frost, Volatile
Condensable Material (VCM)) and window glass overpressurization
and provides necessary fail-safe redundancy. The system is
divided into eight smaller systems each with its own purge and
vent circuits. The systems are as follows:
o Port front and middle outer windshields
o Starboard front and middle outer windshields
o Port outer windshield and overhead window
o Starboard outer windshield and overhead window
o Port inner window cavities
o Starboard inner window cavities
o Side hatch outer cavity
o Side hatch inner cavity
The vent circuit of each system is equipped with a
desiccant/filter canister. The canister removes moisture,
particulates, and VCM contamination from pressurization gases.
If the outer canisters fail to flow properly, check valves,
working in parallel, provide redundancy. The WCCS is connected
by 1/4 to 1 inch brazed stainless steel tubing. WCCS LRUs are
joined to the tubing with Dynatube--fittings.
3.2.6 External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System
The External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System provides helium
to the LH 2 side and gaseous nitrogen to the LO 2 side of the
disconnec£s to prevent cryo--pumping (liquefaction of air) and
icing within the:
o frangible nut canisters
o gap between the disconnect plates
o electrical feed--through cavity, including the ET wire shrouds
The purge gas maintains a positive pressure (P is greater than
or equal to 0.i0 PSID) in the above volumes during prelaunch
operations under cryogenic conditions to prevent back diffusion
of air and the resulting cryo-pumping and/or ice formation.
The purge gas is introduced to the circuit by GSE through a T--O
umbilical disconnect and is ducted to the ET/Orbiter disconnect
compartment via an on--board tubing circuit.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the PV&D subsystem.
Figures 3 thru 8 illustrate the system and corresponding
subassemblies of the PV&D system.
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the PV&D hardware initially generated sixty-
two (62) failure mode worksheets and identified sixteen (16)
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process. These analysis results were compared to the proposed
NASA Post 51-L baseline (20 November 1987) of forty-six (46)
FMEAs and eight (8) CIL items. The discrepancy between the
number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the different
approach used by NASA and IOA to group failure modes and define
subsystem hardware components. Upon completion of the assessment
three (3) failure modes were generated by the IOA analysis that
were not covered by the NASA FMEAs. The IOA recommends the
addition of these failure modes to the NASA FMEA baseline.
In both the IOA analysis report and the NASA FMEA baseline the
PV&D subsystem were divided into the six (6) systems identified
in section 3.0 (subsystem description).
In the following, the unmapped IOA column is the raw number of
IOA failure modes. The mapped IOA column is the number of IOA
failure modes after they have been mapped into the NASA FMEAs.
The issues column is the IOA failure modes that were unable to be
mapped onto NASA FMEAs and/or have differences in criticality or
redundancy screens.
PV&D IOA IOA
Systems Unmapped Mapped NASA Issues
Purge 14 12 I0 1
Vent 14 14 2 0
Drain 5 5 5 0
WCCS 20 19 21 3
HGDS 4 4 5 0
ET/ORB Discn. 5 4 3 1
Total 62 49 46 5
Appendix C presents the detailedassessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
1.0-WP-VA87001-04, Analysis of the PV&D Subsystem, 18 November
1987. Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA
FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendation are
also summarized.
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A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
TABLE I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
System
Purge
Vent
Drain
WCCS
HGDS
ET/ORB Discn.
TOTAL
NASA
I0 14
2 14
5 5
21 20
5 4
3 5
46 62
IOA ISSUES
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
TABLE II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
System
Purge
Vent
Drain
WCCS
HGDS
ET/ORB Discn.
TOTAL
NASA
m
- 6
7 8
m
1 2
8 16
IOA ISSUES
3
3
18
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Table III presents a summary of the recommended failure
criticalities for each of the six (6) systems of the PV&D
subsystem. Further discussion of each of these systems and the
applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs of
this section.
TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
TOTALCriticality:
Purge System
HGDS
Drain System
WCCS
Vent System
ET/ORB Discn.
TOTAL
i/i
2
2
2/IR
4
6
i0
2/2
2
2
3/IR
0
3/2R
0
3/3
14
4
5
12
8
3
46
14
4
5
20
14
5
62
Four (4) of the sixty-two (62) failure modes analyzed were
determined to be single failures which could result in loss of
crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any
of twelve (12) single failures occurred. A summary of the
potential critical items is presented in Table IV. Appendix D
presents a cross reference between each potential critical item
(PCI) and a specific assessment worksheet in Appendix C.
TABLE IV Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality: 2/IR 2/2 TOTAL
Purge System
HGDS
Drain System
WCCS
Vent System
ET/ORB Discn.
1/1
2
2
m
4
6
n
2
3/IR 3/2R
m
i
8
6
2
TOTAL 4 I0 2 0 0 16
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pThe scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
Table V IOA Worksheets Numbers
System IOA ID Number
Purge
Vent
Drain
WCCS
HGDS
ET/ORB Discn.
PV&D-9001 to PV&D-9014
PV&D-9044 to PV&D-9057
PV&D-9019 to PV&D-9023
PV&D-9024 to PV&D-9043
PV&D-9015 to PV&D-9018
PV&D-9058 to PV&D-9062
4.1
4.2
4.3
Assessment Results -- Purge System
The IOA analysis generated fourteen (14) failure modes for
the Purge System all of which are identified as criticality
3/3. The assessment between the IOA Purge System worksheets
and NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline produced one issue.
IOA recommends the addition of a FMEA to the NASA Baseline
for the failure mode, check valve leakage, identified in IOA
worksheet 9009. The criticality for this failure mode is
3/3. IOA also has deleted IOA worksheet 9014 as the failure
mode, ducting clog, does not appear to be a credible
failure.
Assessment Results -- Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS)
The IOA analysis generated four (4) failure modes for the
HGDS all of which are identified as criticality 3/3. The
assessment between the IOA HGDS worksheets and NASA Post
51-L FMEA/CIL baseline produced no issues. The assessment
also produced one (i) additional IOA analysis worksheet
(9063X) to cover the failure mode, HGDS quick disconnect
fail to disconnect. The IOA analysis results for this
additional FMEA agreed with the NASA findings.
Assessment Results -- Drain System
The IOA analysis generated five (5) failure modes for the
Drain System all of which are determined to be criticality
3/3. The assessment between IOA worksheets and NASA Post
51-L Baseline FMEA/CIL produced no issues.
_
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4.4
4.5
Assessment Results - Window Cavity Condition System (WCCS)
The IOA analysis generated twenty (20) failure modes for the
WCCS. Of the identified failure modes two (2) are
criticality 1/1, four (4) are criticality 2/1R, two (2) are
criticality 2/2, and twelve (12) are criticality 3/3. Eight
(8) failure are identified as PCIs. These PCIs are listed
in Appendix D. The assessment between the IOA WCCS
Worksheets and NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL produced three (3)
issues. IOA recommends the addition •of a FMEA to the NASA
Baseline for the failure mode, WCCS outer cavity tubing
clogging, identified in IOA Worksheet 9036. The criticality
for this failure mode is i/i and therefore also requires
NASA generate a CIL. IOA agreed with, after further
review/analysis, NASA Baseline FMEA/CIL 01-5-332404-5, WCCS
desiccant filter outer cavity leakage, criticality of 1/1.
However, NASA Baseline FMEA/CIL 01-5-332404-6 describes same
component, same failure, same results but different windows
with the same design as a criticality 3/3. IOA recommends
combining the two NASA FMEAs with a criticality i/i. IOA
disagrees with NASA baseline FMEA 01-5-332406-5 designated
criticality 3/3. IOA worksheet 9037 for the same failure
mode, WCCS outer cavity tubing leakage, identifies the
criticality as i/i. NASA Baseline FMEA 01-5-332403-1
identifies the same failure mode for the tubing but for a
different set of windows as a criticality 1/1. After
further analysis IOA determined that the windows are all of
the same design. Therefore the criticality of 1/1 should be
consistent. IOA recommends the combination of NASA
FMEA/CILs 01-5-332403-1 and 01-5-332406-5 with an identified
criticality of i/I presented on NASA baseline FMEA/CIL 01-5-
3320403-1 and IOA worksheet 9037.
Assessment Results - Vent System
The IOA analysis generated fourteen (14) failure modes for
the Vent System. Of the identified failure modes six (6)
are criticality 2/1R, and eight (8) are criticality 3/3.
Six (6) failures are identified as PCIs. These PCIs are
listed in Appendix D. THe assessment between the IOA
worksheets and NASA Post 51-L Baseline produced no issues.
IOA generated IOA worksheets 9044 thru 9055 which covered
the Orbiter Vent Door and Hinge bearing, these worksheets
had no corresponding FMEAs in the PV&D Baseline. However,
corresponding FMEAs where generated in the Active Vent
Door/Mechanical Acutation NASA Post 51-L Baseline. In the
Initial Review IOA and NASA disagreed with screen A. After
further Review/Analysis IOA agreed with the NASA Baseline,
understanding that detection of one of the dual bearing
failure was not credible during OMRSD defined testing.
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4.6 Assessment Results - ET/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System
The IOA analysis generated five (5) failure modes for the
ET/ORB Disconnect Purge System. Of the identified failure
modes two (2) are criticality i/I, and three (3) are
criticality 3/3. Two (2) failure modes are identified as
PCIs. These PCIs are listed in Appendix D. The assessment
between the IOA worksheets and the NASA Post 51-L Baseline
produced one issue. IOA recommends the addition of a FMEA
to the NASA Baseline for the failure mode, ET/ORB purge
disconnect external leakage, identified in IOA worksheet
9060. The criticality for this failure mode is 3/3. IOA
recognizes this as a credible failure mode.
<
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AOA
ATO
CIL
CRIT
CWS
ECLSS
EPDC
EPG
ET
FC
FCP
FMEA
FSSR
GAS
GPC
GSE
HDC
IOA
MDAC
MDM
NA
NASA
NSTS
OF
OMRSD
OMS
PCA
PCI
PLS
PRCB
PRS DS
PSA
PV&D
RCS
RI
RPC
RTLS
STS
TAL
TCS
VCM
WCCS
WRS
- Abort-Once-Around
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Critical Items List
- Criticality
- Caution and Warning System
- Environmental Control and Life Support System
(Subsystem)
- Electrical Power, Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power Generator
- External Tank
- Fuel Cell
- Fuel Cell Power (Plant)
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
- Get-Away Special
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Hybrid Driver Controller
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Forward
- Operational Maintenance Requirements &
Specifications Document
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Primary Landing Site
- Program Requirements Control Board
- Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
- Power Section Assembly
- Purge Vent & Drain
- Reaction Control System
- Rockwell International
- Remote Power Controller
- Return-to-Landing Site
- Space Transportation System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Thermal Control System (Subsystem)
- Volatile Condensable Material
- Window Cavity Conditioning System
- Water Removal Subsystem
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B.I Definitions
B.2 Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONSe GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TA__LL- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AO___A- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP__SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at_transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULESt AND ASSUMPTIONS
B°2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
Io
•
•
•
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs)°
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passageof Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
U
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9001
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380001-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9001
UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-2
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!APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9002
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380001-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9002
UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-3
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9003
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380001-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9003
UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS-.
[ ]
[ ]
i
!i!i:
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: PV&D-9004
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380001-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9004
VALVE, UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-5
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9005
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380001-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9005
VALVE, UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-6
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9006
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9006
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-7
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9007
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380003-2
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9007
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-8
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9008
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9008
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-9
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: PV&D-9009
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9009
ITEM: CHECKVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VALVE LEAKAGE COULD OCCUR AT THE MOUNTING FLANGES AT THE DUCTING.
FAILURE IS CONSIDERED CREDIBLE, THE GENERATION OF A NASA FMEA IS
RECOMMENDED FOR IOAANALYSIS WORK SHEET 9009.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-10
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: PV&D-9010
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-38005-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDACID: 9010
ITEM: CHECKVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-II
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9011
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-38005-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9011
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-12
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
!
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9012
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-38005-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9012
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-13
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9013
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-38004-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9013
DUCTING/FLEXIBLE BELLOWS/STRAPS
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
!%
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
L
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
PV&D-9014
PV&D
9014
DUCTING
P. BYNUM
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PURGE DUCTING CLOG DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE.
DUCT SIZING RANGES BETWEEN 1.5 INCHES TO ii INCHES IN DIAMETER
AND THE PURGE MEDIUM IS FILTERED PRIOR TO INTRODUCTION TO THE
ORBITER PURGE DUCTING. THEREFORE IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 9014
HAS BEEN CANCELLED.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-15
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9015
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380301-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9015
UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9016
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380301-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9016
UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-17
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9017
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380302-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9017
ITEM: PIPING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [ ]
v
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9018
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380302-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9018
ITEM: PIPING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9019
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-384051-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9019
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9020
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-384051-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9020
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: PV&D-9021
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-384051-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9021
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: PV&D-9022
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-384052-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9022
ITEM: TUBING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9023
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-384052-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9023
ITEM: TUBING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
L
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9024
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332401-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9024
GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9025
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332401-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9025
GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9026
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332401-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9026
GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9027
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332405-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9027
ASCENT RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
PV&D-9028
01-5-33405-5
PV&D
9028
ASCENT RELIEF VALVE
P. BYNUM
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[ ]
C ]
B
C ]
C ]
C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9029
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-33405-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9029
ASCENT RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
i
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9030
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332405-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9030
DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9031
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332405-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9031
DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
F
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9032
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332405-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9032
DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENTID: PV&D-9033
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332404-1, -332408-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9033
DESICCANT/FILTER OUTERCAVITY
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9034
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332404-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9034
DESICCANT/FILTER OUTER CAVITY
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9035
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332404-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9035
DESICCANT/FILTER OUTER CAVITY
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER FURTHER REVIEW/ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA BASELINE
FMEA, AS FAILURE MODE COULD BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING SAME EFFECT
AS WCCS TUBING LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9035A
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332404-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9035
DESICCANT/FILTER OUTER CAVITY
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA BASELINE FMEA/CIL 01-5-332404-5 AND IOA ASSESSMENT SHEET
PV&D-9035 ADDRESS THE SAME FAILURE MODE BUT FOR A DIFFERENT
WINDOW CAVITY WITH THE SAME DESIGN. IOA ASSESSMENT SHEET PV&D-
9035 AGREED WITH THE NASA BASELINE CRITICALITY OF i/i. THEREFORE
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE CRITICALITY OF NASA FMEA/CIL 01-5-
332404-6 BE UPGRADED TO CRITICALITY i/i.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9036
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9036
ITEM: TUBING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/l ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A PV&D FMEA/CIL WAS NOT FOUND FOR THE FAILURE MODE, WCCS OUTER
TUBING CLOGS. TUBING CLOGS WILL DEGRADE WCCS DEPRESSURIZATION
AND REPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY WITH POSSIBLE THERMAL PANE
RUPTURE. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A FMEA/CIL BE ADDED FOR
THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9037
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332403-1
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9037
ITEM: TUBING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA BASELINE FMEA 01-5-332406-5 HAS A CRITICALITY 3/3 FOR THE
SAME FAILURE MODE, SAME HARDWARE, SAME EFFECT AS NASA BASELINE
FMEA 01-5-332403-1 WHICH HAS A CRITICALITY OF i/I. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT NASA EITHER COMBINE THE TWO FMEAs OR UPGRADE
THE 3/3 TO A i/i.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9037A
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332406-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9037
ITEM: TUBING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA BASELINE FMEA 01-5-332406-5 HAS A CRITICALITY 3/3 FOR THE
SAME FAILURE MODE, SAME HARDWARE, SAME EFFECT AS NASA BASELINE
FMEA 01-5-332403-1 WHICH HAS A CRITICALITY OF i/I. IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT NASA EITHER COMBINE THE TWO FMEAs OR UPGRADE
THE 3/3 TO A i/I.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9038
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332408-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9038
ITEM: DESICCANT/FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS/REVIEW IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL
BASELINE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9039
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332408-4, -332409-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9039
DESICCANT/FILTER, INNER WINDOW
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
i¸¸
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9040
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332408-2, -332409-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9040
DESICCANT/FILTER, INNER WINDOW
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9041
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332409-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9041
DESICCANT/FILTER, INNER WINDOW
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9042
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332406-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9042
ITEM: TUBING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS/REVIEW IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL
BASELINE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9043
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-332406-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9043
ITEM: TUBING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
ix] .....
[ ]
i;
li'
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9044
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380101-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
PV&D
9044
DOOR ASSEMBLY, FORWARD FUSELAGE
P. BYNUM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER FURTHER REVIEW IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA BASELINE SCREEN A.
IOA AGREES THAT THERE IS NOT AN APPARENT METHOD VIA OMRSD DEFINED
TESTING TO DETECT FIRST FAILURE OF DUAL ROTATIONAL HINGE BEARING.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9045
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380101-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9045
DOOR ASSEMBLY, FORWARD FUSELAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ 3 [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ] i_
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9046
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380117-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9046
DOOR ASSEMBLY, PAYLOAD BAY
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
AFTER FURTHER REVIEW IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA BASELINE SCREEN A.
IOA AGREES THAT THEIR APPEARS TO BE NO APPARENT METHOD TO DETECT
THE FIRST FAILURE OF A DUAL ROTATIONAL HINGE BEARING WHICH CAN BE
DEFINED IN OMRSD TESTING.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9047
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380117-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9047
DOOR ASSEMBLY, PAYLOAD BAY
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS .-
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9048
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380109-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9048
DOOR ASSEMBLY, WINGS AND MID FUSELAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FMEA BASELINE.
SEE MDAC ID PV&D-9046 FOR DETAIL.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9049
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380109-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9049
DOOR ASSEMBLY, WINGS AND MID FUSELAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
/
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9050
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380125-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9050
DOOR ASSEMBLY, AFT FUSELAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER FURTHER REVIEW IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FMEA SCREEN A
DESIGNATION. SEE PV&D-9046 FOR DETAIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENTID: PV&D-9051
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380125-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9051
DOOR ASSEMBLY, AFT FUSELAGE
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
[ ]
[ ]
F
i:
E
i/
i!:i¸
I/i
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L
i'
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9052
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380133-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9052
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, WING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9053
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380133-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9053
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, WING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable) .:.....
ADEQUATE [ ] .......
INADEQUATE [ ]
/
B_
_L
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t_::
I:
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9054
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380134-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9054
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, WING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9055
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380134-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9055
PASSIVE RELIEF VENT DOOR, WING
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [ ]
[
i;
I:
E
_T
_7
F
L
L
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9056
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380101-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9056
FILTER, LMF/PLD BAY
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9057
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9057
ITEM: SHIELD, EMI
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-60
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9058
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-385002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9058
ET/ORB PURGE DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-61
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9059
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-385002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9059
ET/ORB PURGE DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9060
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9060
ET/ORB PURGE DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A PV&D FMEA WAS NOT GENERATED FOR THE FAILURE MODE, ET/ORB PURGE
DISCONNECT LEAKAGE. LEAKAGE WILL DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY TO
SUPPLY PURGE GAS TO THE ET/ORB PURGE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK.
LEAKAGE SHOULD BE DETECTED DURING GROUND OPS PRIOR TO LIFT OFF.
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT NASA GENERATE A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE
MODE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9061
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-385001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9061
ET/ORB PURGE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-64
5
i!
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9062
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-385001-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
PV&D
9062
ET/ORB PURGE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
P. BYNUM
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ i /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9063X
NASA FMEA #: 01-5-380301-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV&D
9063
UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS-.
[ ]
[ ]
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NASA FMEA MDAC ID
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM FAILURE MODE
01-5-332405-1
01-5-332405-1
01-5-332404-1
01-5-332404-5
01-5-332403-1
01-5-332406-1
01-5-380101-1
01-5-380117-1
01-5-380109-1
01-5-380125-1
01-5-3'80133-2
01-5-380134-2
01-5-385001-1
01-5-385001-I
9027
9031
9033
9035
9037
9042
9043
9044
9046
9048
9050
9052
9054
9061
9062
ASCENT RELIEF VALVE
DESCENT RELIEF VALVE
DESICCANT FILTER
OUTER CAVITY
DESICCANT FILTER
TUBING
TUBING
TUBING
VENT DOOR (1, 2)
VENT DOOR (3, 5, 6)
VENT DOOR (4, 7)
VENT DOOR (8, 9)
ASCENT RELIEF VENT
DESCENT RELIEF VENT
ET/ORB PURGE
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
ET/ORB PURGE
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN
CLOGS
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
CLOGS
LEAKAGE
JAMMING
JAMMING
JAMMING
JAMMING
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN
CLOGS
LEAKAGE
D-I

APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA87001-
04, Analysis of the Purge, Vent and Drain Subsystem, (18 November
1987). Prior results were obtained independently and documented
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, i0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/23/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: PV&D FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 9063 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UMBILICAL DISCONNECT
FAILS TO DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM SUBSYS LEAD: P. BYNUM
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) PV&D
2 ) HGDS
3) UMBILICAL DISCONNECT (3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: T-O DISCONNECT PANEL
PART NUMBER: MC276-0021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO DISCONNECT IS PRECLUDED DUE TO DISCONNECT DESIGN.
THEIR ARE NO MECHANICAL CONNECTIONS WHICH COULD PREVENT THE
MOUNTING PLATES FROM DISCONNECTING.
REFERENCES: MC276-0021, V070-385071
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-2
APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
1 IOA issue.
2 IOA recommends deleting the IOA failure mode as the
failure mode is non-credible.
3 IOA generated a failure mode covered by Mechanical
Actuator subsystem.
4 IOA recommends generating a FMEA for the subsystem
failure mode.
5 IOA agrees with the criticality identified by the NASA
FMEA/CIL.
6 IOA recommends upgrading the NASA FMEA/CIL to the IOA
assessed criticality level and/or redundancy screen
designation.
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APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE / RECOMMENDATIONS
-TI
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IDENTIFIERS NASA IOA RECOMMENDATIONS *
NASA IOA CRIT SCREENS CRIT SCREENS OTHER ISSUE
FMEA NUMBER ASSESSMENT NO. HW/F A B C HW/F A B C (SEE LEGEND CODE)
01-5-332401-1
01-5-332401-2
01-5-332401-3
01-5-332403-1
01-5-332404-1
01-5-332404-4
01-5-332404-5
01-5-332404-6
01-5-332405-1
01-5-332405-1
01-5-332405-5
01-5-332405-5
01-5-332405-6
01-5-332405-6
01-5-332406-1
01-5-332406-3
01-5-332406-5
01-5-332408-1
01-5-332408-2
01-5-332408-4
01-5-332408-5
01-5-332409-1
01-5-332409-4
01-5-332409-5
PV&D-9009
PV&D-9014
PV&D-9036
PV&D-9060
PV&D-9024
PV&D-9025
PV&D-9026
PV&D-9037
PV&D-9033
PV&D-9034
PV&D-9035
PV&D-9035A
PV&D-9027
PV&D-9031
PV&D-9028
PV&D-9030
PV&D-3029
PV&D-9032
PV&D-9043
PV&D-9042
PV&D-9037A
PV&D-9033
I
I
I
I
3/3
3/3
3/3
1/1
2/1R
3/3
1/1
3/3
211R
211R
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/2
3/3
3/3
2/1R
P NAP
P NAP
P NAP
P NAP
3/3
/
1/1
3/3
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
1/1
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
1/1
4
2
i, 4
4
5
i, 6
5
i, 6
PV&D-9040
PV&D-9039
PV&D-9038
PV&D-9040
PV&D-9039
PV&D-9041
3/3
3/3
2/2
3/3
3/3
3/3
I
I
I
I
I
I
X
X
X
X
X
"17
!
OO
IDENTIFIERS
NASA
FMEA NUMBER
NASA FMEA TO
01-5-380001-1
01-5-380001-2
01-5-380001-3
01-5-380001-4
01-5-380001-5
01-5-380003-1
01-5-380003-2
01-5-380003-2
01-5-380004-1
01-5-380005-1
01-5-380005-2
01-5-380005-2
01-5-380101-1
01-5-380101-1
01-5-380101-2
01-5-380101-2
01-5-380109-1
01-5-380109-2
01-5-380117-1
01-5-380117-2
01-5-380125-1
01-5-380125-2
01-5-380133-1
01-5-380133-2
01-5-380134-1
01-5-380134-2
01"5-380301-1
01-5-380301-3
01-5-380302-1
IOA
ASSESSMENT NO.
IOA WORKSHEET CROSS
CRIT
HW/F
L
I SCREENS
A B C
REFERENCE / RECOMMENDATIONS
IOA RECOMMENDATIONS *
CRIT
HW/F
SCREENS
A B C
OTHER
(SEE LEGEND CODE)
PV&D-9001
PV&D-9002
PV&D-9003
PV&D-9004
PV&D-9005
PV&D-9006
PV&D-9007
PV&D-9008
PV&D-9013
PV&D-9010
PV&D-9011
PV&D-9012
PV&D-9044
PV&D-9057
PV&D-9045
PV&D-9056
PV&D-9048
PV&D-9049
PV&D-9046
PV&D-9047
PV&D-9050
PV&D-9051
PV&D-9053
PV&D-9052
PV&D-9055
PV&D-9054
PV&D-9015
PV&D-9016
PV&D-9018
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/IR
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/1R
3/3
2/1R
3/3
2/1R
3/3
3/3
2/1R
3/3
2/1R
3/3
3/3
3/3
F NAP
F NAP
F NAP
F NAP
P NAP
P NAP
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
/
I
I
/
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
3, 5
3
3, 5
3
3, 5
3
3, 5
3
3
3
3
3
ISSUE
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE / RECOMMENDATIONS
IDENTIFIERS NASA IOA RECOMMENDATIONS *
NASA IOA CRIT SCREENS CRIT SCREENS OTHER ISSUE
FMEA NUMBER ASSESSMENT NUM HW/F A B C HW/F A B C (SEE LEGEND CODE)
01-5-380302-2
01-5-384051-1
01-5-384051-2
01-5-384051-3
01-5-384052-1
01-5-384052-2
01-5-380001-5
01-5-385001-1
01-5-385001-1
01-5-385002-1
01-5-385002-2
PV&D-9017
PV&D-9019
PV&D-9020
PV&D-9021
PV&D-9023
PV&D-9022
PV&D-9005
PV&D-9061
PV&D-9062
PV&D-9058
PV&D-9059
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
1/1
1/1
3/3
3/3
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
!
4_
